Build Agents

Overview

Auths signs and verifies in CI/CD using ephemeral keys — there are no long-lived API keys or agent tokens to store as secrets. Two GitHub Actions cover the workflow:

• auths-dev/sign — sign commits and/or build artifacts in CI.
• auths-dev/verify — verify signatures on pull requests and releases.

Verify on every pull request

name: Verify provenance
on: [pull_request]

jobs:
  verify:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
        with:
          fetch-depth: 0
      - uses: auths-dev/verify@v1
        with:
          auths-version: '0.1.2'   # pin the CLI (the action never resolves "latest")
          fail-on-unsigned: 'true'
          post-pr-comment: 'true'
        # github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}   # only for the PR comment

Sign artifacts on release

name: Sign release artifacts
on:
  release:
    types: [published]

jobs:
  sign:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      contents: write
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - uses: auths-dev/sign@v1
        with:
          auths-version: '0.1.2'
          files: |
            dist/*.tar.gz
          fail-on-unanchored: 'true'

The sign action emits signed-files, attestation-files (the .auths.json sidecars), and signed-commits outputs you can publish as release assets.

Stateless verification with an identity bundle

By default the verify action verifies against each signer's key event log (KEL). For stateless verification against a specific identity, export a bundle and pass it in:

auths id export-bundle    # advanced (auths --help-all); commit to .auths/ci-bundle.json

      - uses: auths-dev/verify@v1
        with:
          identity-bundle: .auths/ci-bundle.json
          auths-version: '0.1.2'

Scoped agent credentials

For an autonomous agent (not a CI step) that needs to act on its own, delegate a scoped, expiring passport rather than reuse a human key — see the bounded-agent gateway.

Security considerations

1. No secrets to leak — CI signing uses ephemeral keys.
2. Always pin auths-version — never resolve latest (supply-chain hardening).
3. Publish a trust root (.auths/roots) so verifiers can anchor your signatures; fail-on-unanchored keeps you honest.
4. Least privilege — give agents scoped, time-bounded delegation.

Related

• Sign Commits
• Prove Provenance
• GitHub Actions reference
• The bounded agent